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THE ONCE AND FUTURE NEW YORK  
STOCK EXCHANGE: THE REGULATION  
OF GLOBAL EXCHANGES 
Roberta S. Karmel* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On June 2, 2006, NYSE Group, Inc. (NYSE Group), the parent of the 
New York Stock Exchange, Inc. (NYSE), announced a plan to merge with 
Euronext NV (Euronext), creating the first trans-Atlantic linkup of stock 
and derivatives markets.1 Euronext is a Dutch holding company that, since 
2000, has been operating, through subsidiaries, the former stock exchanges 
of Amsterdam, Paris, Brussels and Lisbon. In 2001, Euronext also acquired 
the London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange 
(LIFFE).2 Euronext is the first pan-European exchange trading cash and 
derivatives and equities and bonds. The London Stock Exchange (LSE) also 
has been the object of trans-national takeover attention, having received 
bids from Deutsche Borse, Macquarie Bank of Australia and the Nasdaq 
Stock Market (Nasdaq).3 
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 1. See Bernard Wysocki Jr. & Aaron Lucchetti, Without Borders: Global Exchanges Pose a 
Quandary for Securities Cops, WALL ST. J., June 5, 2006, at A1; Ian McDonald & Aaron 
Lucchetti, Will the NYSE’s Colossal Merger Help Investors?, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2006, at B1.  
This article is dated as of November 2006.  Since then, the merger of the NYSE and Euronext has 
been accomplished and a bid by Nasdaq for the LSE appears to have failed.  These events do not 
alter the analysis in the article. See Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rule Change and Notice 
of Filing and Order Granting Approval to Amendment No. 1 Regarding the Proposed 
Combination Between NYSE Group, Inc. and Euronext N.V., 72 Fed. Reg. 8033 (Feb. 22, 2007); 
Press Release, N.Y. Stock Exch., NYSE Euronext Celebrates Completion of NYSE Group, 
Inc./Euronext N.V. Merger (Apr. 4, 2007), available at http://www.nyse.com/events/ 
1175251256417.html. 
 2. In October of 2001, Euronext—created only a year earlier through a merger of the Paris, 
Amsterdam, and Brussels securities exchanges—out-bid the LSE and Deutsche Borse to acquire 
LIFFE. See Vincent Boland & Charles Pretzlik, Euronext Wins Battle for Liffe: Paris-Based 
Operator Beats Rivals with Pounds 555m bid for exchange, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 30, 2001, 
at 1. Acquiring LIFFE, the second largest derivatives market in Europe, allowed Euronext to boast 
diverse products—securities and derivatives—across diverse markets—French, Belgian, Dutch, 
and now British constituents, giving Euronext LIFFE a significant place in the world of 
consolidating financial markets. See Peter Martin, The End of Liffe As We Know It: Euronext’s 
Deal Has Given it an Edge in the Consolidation of European Financial Markets but There is 
Much Still to Play For, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 30, 2001, at 23. 
 3. See Aaron Lucchetti & Alistair MacDonald, Ready to Deal: $60 Billion in Two Days, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2006, at C1; Alistair MacDonald & Aaron Lucchetti, Nasdaq Stock Market 
is Cleared to Launch a Bid for the LSE, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2006, at B2; Battle of the Bourses, 
ECONOMIST, May 27, 2006, at 65; Crossing the Pond, ECONOMIST, Mar. 18, 2006, at 67. 
Deutsche Borse and Euronext also considered a merger. See David Reilly & Jason Singer, Moving 
the Market: Euronext, Deutsche Borse Are Urged to Merge, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2006, at C5. 
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Whether any of these or other cross-border exchange consolidations 
will come to fruition, and the future structure of such transactions, is 
probably more a matter of politics and regulation than business exigencies 
and is therefore difficult to predict. National political opposition to the 
development of global exchanges is strong.4 But as John Thain, the CEO of 
the NYSE remarked, “Most countries have an army, a flag, an airline and an 
exchange. . . . As the markets have become more global, that nationalist 
tendency on the part of exchanges—at least those that want to compete 
globally—has to break down.”5 
Another factor in the inevitable globalization of exchanges is that 
exchanges have demutualized and become public companies. They need to 
please their shareholders as well as their customers. Further, in the process 
of moving from mutual not-for-profit citadels of capitalism to public 
companies, national exchanges have lost their exclusivity and their 
mystique. Consequently, they should no longer be regarded as national 
champions, but permitted to function as ordinary companies. Although they 
play a key role in capital formation, the capital markets are no longer 
national. Although the images of the NYSE and Nasdaq were both 
tarnished by the scandals of recent years, they can probably best restore 
their former luster by competing as successful businesses in the global 
marketplace.6 
At least three reasons for a merger between the NYSE and Euronext 
have been put forward. First, is the idea that investors will be able to buy 
stocks in the United States and Europe, thus making it more attractive and 
cheaper for them to buy foreign shares.7 The NYSE and other U.S. 
exchanges have been losing listings, and especially IPOs, to European 
exchanges; merging with a European exchange may be a way to recapture 
the fees and trading profits from these listings.8 However, the primary 
reasons why the NYSE has been losing listings is that foreign issuers are 
disenchanted with the U.S. stock market because of the costs of compliance 
                                                                                                                 
 4. See Jenny Anderson & Heather Timmons, NYSE’s Coup Stirs Political Opposition in 
Europe, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2006, at C1; Alstair MacDonald, U.K. Frets Over LSE Takeover, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2006, at C12; Aaron Lucchetti, Big Board Sees a Bond Bonanza, WALL ST. 
J., June 21, 2006, at C1; see also Heather Timmons, Skeptics Blunting Rumor Mill, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 23, 2006, at C6. 
 5. Lucchetti, supra note 4, at C2. 
 6. See In the Matter of Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Exchange Act Release No. 37,542, 1996 
SEC LEXIS (Aug. 8, 1996) (investigating anti-competitive practices by Nasdaq market makers); 
Press Release, SEC Charges the NYSE with Failing to Police Specialists (Apr. 12, 2005), 
available at http:/www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-53.htm; Jenny Anderson, S.E.C. Asked Grasso if 
He Buoyed Stock, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2006, at C1. 
 7. See Aaron Lucchetti, Global Investing Made Easy, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 2006, at B1; 
McDonald & Lucchetti, supra note 1, at B1. 
 8. See Jenny Anderson & Heather Timmons, NYSE Group Aims to Buy European Exchange, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2006, at Cl; Aaron Lucchetti, NYSE, via Euronext, Aims to Regain Its 
Appeal for International Listings, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2006, at C1. 
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with the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-
Oxley)9 and because of the U.S. culture of shareholder litigation.10 The 
merger of the NYSE and Euronext will not result in the automatic dual 
listing of issuers in Europe and the United States, a result that is not even 
desired at this time, but the potential for giving U.S. investors easier and 
cheaper access to investments in foreign securities is important. 
A second justification for the NYSE-Euronext merger is that it will give 
the NYSE a derivatives platform. Although the NYSE launched a 
commodity futures exchange in 1979, this was not a successful business 
venture and was sold to the New York Cotton Exchange (NYCE) in 1993.11 
In the meantime, the trading of derivatives has skyrocketed and the NYSE 
would like to participate in this business. In the past, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) was opposed to side-by-side trading of 
equities and derivatives at an exchange because it considered such trading 
to have the potential for giving unfair informational advantages to an 
exchange that traded both equities and options or futures on such equities.12 
Given the changes that have since occurred in the markets, the SEC should 
not impose constraints on the ownership of a derivatives exchange by the 
NYSE so as to make such a venture uneconomic. 
When two exchanges combine, they can cut staff and share technology. 
Thus, a third reason that has been asserted for the creation of a global 
exchange by the NYSE is that the NYSE and Euronext will be able to 
operate from a common trading platform. This could expand the NYSE’s 
                                                                                                                 
 9. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.). See Nelson Schwartz, IPOs are picking London Over New York, 
CNNMONEY.COM, Dec. 15, 2005, available at http://money.cnn.com/2005/12/15/commentary/ 
pluggedin_fortune/index.htm. 
 10. See Greg Ip, Kara Scannell & Deborah Solomon, Panel Urges Relaxing Rules for 
Oversight, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 2006, at C1; Richard Hill, Regulatory, Litigation Costs Seen as 
Causing Loss of U.S. Listings, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 750 (May 1, 2006). 
 11. In 1980, the NYSE took aim at the financial futures market with the launch of the New 
York Futures Exchange (NYFE). The NYFE represented the NYSE’s attempt to capture some of 
the futures market that was dominated by two Chicago exchanges—the Chicago Board of Trade 
(CBOT) and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). See Steve Lohr, Debut for City’s Futures 
Board, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1980, at D1. On opening day of the new exchange, membership was 
offered at $10,000 to NYSE members and $20,000 to nonmembers. See id. A little over a year 
later, the NYFE was already in trouble, with membership fees to non-NYSE members dropping to 
$8,000. See Paul Betts, The Winners in Oil and Metals, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 1, 1982, at 9. 
By the early 1990’s, membership was offered for only $100, and average daily volume dwindled 
to 5,000 contracts (down from roughly 180,000 in its first year). Conceding the NYFE’s failure, in 
September of 1993, the NYSE spun off the NYFE and merged it with the New York Cotton 
Exchange. See William B. Crawford Jr., N.Y. Futures Exchange Near Deal with Cotton Exchange, 
CHI. TRIB., Aug. 26, 1993, at 3N. 
 12. See Jerry W. Markham, Super Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of Securities and 
Derivatives Regulation in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, 28 BROOK. J.  
INT’L L. 319, 328 n.42 (2003). Arca recently became the “first integrated equities and options 
exchange in the U.S.” Andrei Postelnicu, Archipelago Buys Pacific Exchange, FIN. TIMES 
(London), Jan. 5, 2005, at 29. 
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bond trading business as well as its equities business.13 Whether these 
synergies will be able to be fully realized in the face of different trading 
systems and different regulatory requirements for the trading of securities in 
the United States and Europe remains to be seen. 
Despite the several sound reasons for a trans-national merger between 
exchanges, stock exchanges cannot compete as ordinary business 
enterprises because of the manner in which they are regulated and because 
they function as self-regulatory organizations (SROs). Unless such 
regulation is significantly changed, the effort by exchanges to become 
global companies will be impeded. This Article will discuss the 
impediments to the creation of a global exchange posed by the U.S. federal 
securities laws and how these laws could be changed to permit the possible 
synergies of a combination between the NYSE or Nasdaq and a foreign 
exchange to be better achieved. 
Even if the NYSE and Euronext merge, or some other consolidation 
between a U.S. exchange and a foreign exchange comes about, securities 
listed on Euronext will not be able to trade on the NYSE and Euronext will 
not be recognized as a U.S. securities exchange. Further, neither Euronext’s 
issuers nor Euronext wish to be regulated by the U.S. SEC, and there have 
been assurances from SEC officials that they would not assert jurisdiction 
over Euronext or its listed companies.14 Part II of this Article will discuss 
the regulation of foreign issuers and inquire whether the creation of a global 
exchange finally will lead to convergence between U.S. and European 
regulation and the development of a regime of mutual recognition. 
In addition to the divergence of regulation of issuers in the United 
States and elsewhere, the United States and Europe have both recently 
passed regulations covering the trading of securities in the public securities 
markets, these regulations also diverge. Part III of this Article will discuss 
the differences between such regulation of trading in the context of foreign 
exchange access issues. Although much has been made of the possibilities 
of synergies in a NYSE-Euronext combination, the development of a 
common trading platform may be impeded by regulatory constraints on the 
trading of securities. 
Part IV of this Article will discuss the approach of the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) with regard to foreign exchange 
access, in contrast to the approach of the SEC and inquire whether the SEC 
should adopt the approach of the CFTC. Yet, while it might be easier for 
LIFFE to enter the U.S. markets than it would be for Euronext to do so, 
                                                                                                                 
 13. See Lucchetti, supra note 4, at C2. 
 14. See Kip Betz & Rachel McTague, NYSE, Euronext $208 Merger Plan Would Create 
World’s Largest Exchange, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 962 (June 5, 2006); Judith 
Burns, SEC Aims to Ease Europe’s Fears On Cross-Border Market Merger, WALL ST. J., June 17, 
2006, at B2. 
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such a move would likely generate opposition from U.S. commodities 
exchanges. 
A discussion of the need for a reworking of the regulation of listed 
companies and exchange trading would be incomplete without reference to 
the potential changes in the SRO’s functions of exchanges. Part V of this 
Article will discuss the future of self-regulation by exchanges. Although 
self-regulation is deeply imbedded in the federal securities laws and the 
structure of the securities industry, it could become a casualty of the 
dramatic changes in the organization and functioning of exchanges. 
Although the author is loathe to see the end of exchanges as SROs, and 
believes that self-regulation has served the country well for all of its flaws, 
as the conflicts between the operation of exchanges as global businesses 
and regulators become more apparent, a serious reworking of how 
exchanges operate as regulators is in order. 
If the NYSE-Euronext merger goes through, or even if it fails, now that 
the creation of a global exchange is a serious business plan by the NYSE 
Group, and by Nasdaq, bold action by the SEC will be required for the 
United States to remain a dominant competitor in the global markets. 
Whether the SEC will have the political backbone to take such action 
remains to be seen. If it does not, a deterioration in the power and efficiency 
of the NYSE and Nasdaq as leading exchanges could be a consequence, 
with a possible adverse effect on U.S. capital formation and the national 
economy. 
II. SEC REGULATION OF FOREIGN ISSUERS 
A. POLICY OF NATIONAL TREATMENT WITH EXEMPTIONS 
Generally, the most common approaches to regulating foreign issuers 
which sell securities to domestic investors are: requiring compliance with 
host country laws (national treatment);15 creating special host country rules 
for them;16 developing harmonized international standards;17 and accepting 
compliance with home country standards (mutual recognition).18 The 
United States has approached this problem through national treatment, with 
some special rules to ameliorate the problems of compliance for foreign 
issuers. By contrast, the European Union (EU) has a regime of mutual 
                                                                                                                 
 15. See Roel C. Campos, Comm’r, SEC, Remarks before the Centre for European Policy 
Studies: Embracing International Business in the Post-Enron Era (June 11, 2003), available at 
www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch061103rcc.htm. 
 16. See id. This has been the SEC’s approach to some extent. 
 17. See Manning Gilbert Warren III, Global Harmonization of Securities Laws: The 
Achievement of the European Communities, 31 HARV. INT’L L. J. 185, 191 (1990). 
 18. See id. at 191–92. 
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recognition.19 While there is no international securities regulator with the 
ability to impose a disclosure or other regulatory regime on all issuers 
worldwide, the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) has developed a template for basic disclosure standards and the 
International Accounting Standard Committee (IASC) is developing 
international accounting standards (formerly known as IASs and now 
known as international financial reporting standards, or IFRS).20 
When the Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities Act) was passed, 
Congress contemplated that foreign issuers might make offerings into the 
United States and provided a special disclosure regime for sovereign debt.21 
Further, the jurisdictional reach of the law extended to interstate and foreign 
commerce.22 The SEC has the authority to impose its disclosure obligations 
on any foreign company that sells shares to U.S. nationals.23 Similarly, the 
SEC could require any foreign issuer with more than 500 shareholders 
worldwide, of which 300 are U.S. investors, and which has $10 million in 
assets to register its equity securities pursuant to the Exchange Act, and 
thereafter be required to make annual and periodic reports to the SEC.24 The 
SEC has not exerted its jurisdiction to this extent. Foreign issuers that 
would be required to file under the Exchange Act because they have $10 
million in assets and 300 out of 500 U.S. shareholders can file for an 
exemption from such registration by filing all documents they are required 
to file in their home jurisdiction in English translation.25 However, their 
securities cannot then trade on an exchange, but only in the pink sheets 
bulletin board. Therefore, if a company wishes to have an active trading 
market for its securities in the United States, it must register under the 
Exchange Act. 
Further, the SEC compels foreign issuers desiring to raise capital in the 
United States or list on a U.S. exchange to enter the SEC disclosure system. 
The attitude of the SEC staff long has been that if a foreign issuer was 
going to tap the U.S. capital markets then it should play by the SEC’s rules. 
                                                                                                                 
 19. See Marc I. Steinberg & Lee E. Michaels, Disclosure in Global Securities Offerings: 
Analysis of Jurisdictional Approaches, Commonality and Reciprocity, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 207, 
255–61 (1999). 
 20. See MARC I. STEINBERG, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW, A CONTEMPORARY AND 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 27–38 (1999). 
 21. See Securities Act, Schedule B, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (2000).  
 22. See Securities Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(7) (2000). 
 23. See Europe and Oversees Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banques Paribas London, 147 F.3d 
118 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1139 (1999) (suggesting that the Securities Act applies 
when both the offer and sale of a security are made in the United States); Consol. Gold Fields PLC 
v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), modified, 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. 
dismissed, 494 U.S. 939 (1989). 
 24. See Exchange Act § 12(b), (g), 15 U.S.C. § 78l(b), (g) (Supp IV 2004); Exchange Act 
§ 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (Supp. II 2002); Exchange Act § 15(d), 15 U.S.C.S. § 78o(d) (LexisNexis 
2006). 
 25. See Rule 12g3-2(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b) (2007). 
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In the mid-1970’s, the SEC requested public comment on improving the 
disclosure required by foreign issuers, noting that the registration forms 
used by the foreign issuers required substantially less information than 
required of U.S. domestic issuers.26 The SEC then adopted Form 20-F as a 
combined registration and annual reporting form;27 but, since corporate 
governance regulation generally was left to the states under U.S. law, it was 
similarly left to the national law of foreign issuers. Among other things, 
foreign issuers were exempted from SEC proxy solicitation regulations and 
short-swing insider transaction reporting requirements.28 Further, in Form 
20-F, the SEC bowed to some of the objections of foreign issuers and 
deleted certain proposed disclosures relating to corporate governance, in 
particular, the disclosure of the business experience and background of 
officers and directors, and the identification of the three highest paid 
officers and directors and the aggregate amount paid to them. In addition, it 
conditioned a material transactions disclosure to the requirements of 
applicable foreign law.29 
Although the SEC generally refused to accord foreign regulators mutual 
recognition with respect to foreign issuer disclosure standards, it 
accommodated them to some extent by developing special registration and 
disclosure requirements for foreign issuers.30 Additionally, following a 
policy of international cooperation during the 1980s and 1990s, the SEC 
fashioned special exemptions for foreign issuers31 and amended its foreign 
issuer disclosure forms to comply with disclosure standards endorsed by 
IOSCO.32 Also, prior to the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC had 
been working toward an international accounting regulatory regime 
pursuant to which foreign issuers might be able to file documents with the 
SEC using IAS (now IFRS) rather than U.S. Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP).33 Similarly, SROs permitted foreign issuers 
                                                                                                                 
 26. See Means of Improving Disclosure by Certain Foreign Private Issuers, Exchange Act 
Release No.14,056, 41 Fed. Reg. 55,012, 55,013 (Dec. 16, 1976). 
 27. See 17 C.F.R. § 249.220f (2005). This continues to be the primary reporting form for 
foreign issuers. 
 28. See id. § 240.3a12-3 (2007). 
 29. See Rules, Registration and Annual Report Form for Foreign Private Issuers, Exchange 
Act Release No. 16,371, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,132, 70,133–35 (Dec. 6, 1979). 
 30. See Adoption of Foreign Issuer Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 
6437, Exchange Act Release No. 19,258, Investment Company Act Release No. 774, 47 Fed. Reg. 
54,764 (Dec. 6, 1982). 
 31. See, e.g., Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901–230.904 (2007); Rule 144A, 17 C.F.R. § 
230.144A (2007); Rule 12g3-2(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b) (2007); Cross-Border Tender and 
Exchange Offers, Business Combinations and Rights Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 7759, 
Exchange Act Release No. 42,054, Investment Company Act Release No. 2378, 64 Fed. Reg. 
61,382 (Nov. 10, 1999). 
 32. See International Disclosure Standards, Securities Act Release No. 7745, Exchange Act 
Release No. 41,936, 64 Fed. Reg. 53,900 (Oct. 5, 1999). 
 33. See International Accounting Standards, Securities Act Release No. 7801, Exchange Act 
Release No. 42,430, 65 Fed. Reg. 8896 (Feb. 23, 2000). 
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to obtain a waiver from many corporate governance requirements, although 
some minimal corporate governance requirements, such as holding an 
annual meeting and maintaining an audit committee, could not be waived. 
B. IMPACT OF SARBANES-OXLEY 
After 2002, foreign issuers were shocked to discover that various 
corporate governance provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley applied to them. They 
had become accustomed to a regime in which the SEC and the NYSE 
“assiduously avoided imposing governance requirements on foreign 
issuers.”34 Foreign issuers viewed the context for Sarbanes-Oxley to be U.S. 
financial scandals and failures, and argued that the SEC should not be 
imposing corporate governance regulations on corporations that functioned 
in very different corporate finance systems and with very different 
structures than U.S. firms.35 Congress and the SEC took a unilateralist 
approach to corporate governance regulation, however, retreating to the 
view that if foreign issuers wish to tap the U.S. capital markets, they need to 
play by U.S. rules. Despite prior SEC reluctance to interfere in the 
corporate governance of foreign corporations, the automatic application of 
many provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley to all SEC registered companies made 
the SEC unwilling to craft exemptions for foreign issuers. Although the 
SEC did exempt foreign issuers from the requirement that their audit 
committees have independent directors if their governance structures 
achieved the same goals as the Sarbanes-Oxley audit committee 
provisions,36 the SEC required foreign issuers to comply with other 
provisions such as the CEO-CFO certification requirements.37 
Compliance with the internal control provisions of section 404 of 
Sarbanes-Oxley38 proved particularly troublesome for foreign issuers. This 
section requires management to examine the effectiveness of a company’s 
internal controls over financial reporting. Not only must the company report 
on such internal controls, but its auditors must attest to them.39 Outside 
audit fees of U.S. companies subject to section 404 have greatly increased, 
and many argue that the costs of compliance with this provision are not 
                                                                                                                 
 34. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock 
Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1824 
(2002). 
 35. See Kathryn Stewart Lehman, Executive Compensation Following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002, 81 N.C. L. REV. 2115, 2132–33 (2003). 
 36. See Final Rule: Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Securities Act 
Release No. 8220, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,788 (Apr. 16, 2003). 
 37. See Sarbanes-Oxley § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (Supp II 2002); Sarbanes-Oxley § 906, 18 
U.S.C. § 1350 (Supp. II 2002). 
 38. See 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. II 2002). 
 39. See id. 
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worth its benefits.40 Thus far, the SEC has granted foreign issuers an 
extension of time for compliance with this provision, but a permanent 
exemption seems unlikely.41 The SEC may not have the statutory power to 
exempt foreign issuers from section 40442 and, in addition, in 2004 there 
were 1,200 foreign issuers registered with the SEC and foreign issuers 
comprised 16% of the NYSE’s list.43 Further, even if the SEC were now to 
craft exemptions for foreign issuers from the corporate governance and 
internal control provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, foreign issuers would remain 
suspicious of the SEC’s political will or ability to protect them from drastic 
changes in legal requirements in the future. 
Marketplace developments in recent years also made a U.S. listing less 
attractive for foreign issuers. The European markets have matured to a point 
where capital can be raised there to meet the needs of most companies.44 
Foreign, and even some U.S. companies, engaging in IPOs or stock 
exchange listings have done so in Europe, rather than in the United States. 
 In 1999 and 2000, foreign IPOs on U.S. exchanges exceeded $80 
billion—ten times the amount raised in London, but in 2005 London 
exchanges raised over $10.3 billion in foreign IPOs compared to $6 billion 
on U.S. exchanges.45 In 2004, only three out of the twenty-five largest IPOs 
were listed on U.S. exchanges, in 2005 none of the twenty-five largest IPOs 
were listed on U.S. exchanges, and during the first half of 2006, only two of 
the largest twenty-five international IPOs were listed on U.S. exchanges. By 
contrast, in 2000, eleven of the twenty-five largest IPOs were listed on U.S. 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Many have asserted that Sarbanes-Oxley adds tremendous cost—estimated to be in the 
tens of millions of dollars per year in legal and accounting fees—to compliance in the US. See 
Francesco Guerrera & Andrei Postelnicu, A Not So Foreign Exchange: China Shuns the West as a 
Location for Its Big Corp. Share Offers, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 18, 2005, at 17. A high 
powered panel of experts is now examining whether Sarbanes-Oxley needs revision. See Rachel 
McTague, New Panel to Study SOX, Competitiveness of U.S. Public Capital Markets, Issue 
Report, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1569 (Sept. 18, 2006); Panel to Seek Changes to 
Sarbanes-Oxley, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2006, at A2.    
 41. See Internal Control Over Financial Reporting in Exchange Act Periodic Reports of 
Foreign Private Issuers That Are Accelerated Filers, Securities Act Release No. 8730, Exchange 
Act Release No. 54,294, 71 Fed. Reg. 47,056 (Aug. 15, 2006). 
 42. See Rachel McTague, Sarbanes Defends SOX, Lauds Letter Saying SEC Lacks Power for 
404 Exemptions, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 539 n.13 (Mar. 27, 2006). 
 43. See Proposed Rule: Termination of a Foreign Private Issuer’s Registration of a Class of 
Securities Under Section 12(g) and Duty to File Reports Under Section 15(d) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 53,020, 70 Fed. Reg.77,688, 77,689–90 (Dec. 
30, 2005). 
 44. See Kip Betz, Former SEC Official Sees New Realities For Foreign Issuers Seeking to 
Raise Capital, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 852 n.20 (May 15, 2006); see also Greg 
Ip, Is a U.S. Listing Worth the Effort?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2006, at C1. 
 45. See Stephen Fidler, How the Square Mile Defeated the Prophets of Doom, FIN. TIMES 
(London), Dec. 10, 2005, at 11. 
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exchanges.46 Not only have foreign issuers declined to enter the U.S. 
trading markets since 2002, but they have also been lobbying for the ability 
to exit the U.S. disclosure system.  
C. CONVERGENCE OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES 
Since 1982, the SEC has required all foreign companies which enter the 
SEC disclosure system to reconcile their financial statements to U.S. 
GAAP.47 Foreign issuers have always found this requirement burdensome, 
but since last year it has become even more burdensome because the EU, in 
its Transparency Directive,48 adopted IFRS as the applicable disclosure 
standard for all issuers across the EU,49 which is applicable to consolidated 
financial reports and annual and half-yearly statements. 
The SEC was given the statutory power to define accounting terms in 
the Securities Act.50 The SEC, therefore, could have prescribed the 
substantive content of U.S. GAAP, but it delegated this power to the FASB 
and then enforced this regime by accepting U.S. GAAP financials as 
“authoritative” for purposes of SEC filings.51 At one time there was hope 
that U.S. GAAP and IFRS would be harmonized and all companies in the 
international capital markets would report to investors in the same 
accounting language and format.52 Alternatively, the SEC could accept 
IFRS as “authoritative” for purposes of SEC filings without any 
Congressional action and then foreign issuers which report their financial 
statements in IFRS would not have to reconcile to U.S. GAAP. Then U.S. 
issuers would continue to report in U.S. GAAP and foreign issuers wishing 
to list on a U.S. exchange or otherwise enter the U.S. disclosure system 
would report in IFRS if they preferred not to reconcile their financial 
statements to U.S. GAAP. 
Although there has been considerable discussion of a regime under 
which U.S. GAAP and IFRS would have sufficient convergence so that the 
                                                                                                                 
 46. See Lucchetti, supra note 8, at C1. See also Rachel McTague, Citigroup General Counsel 
Blames SEC, In Part for Loss of Global Edge in Markets, 38 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 46, 
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 47. See William C. Freund, That Trade Obstacle, the SEC, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1993, at A6; 
Annette Nazareth, Comm’r, SEC, Remarks Before the Institute for International Bankers Annual 
Conference (Mar. 13, 2006), available at http://www.sec.lgov/news/speech/spch031306aln_ 
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 48. See Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
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 49. See Stuart H. Deming, Int’l Accounting Standards, 40 INT’L LAWYER 363, 364 (2006). 
 50. See Securities Act § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (Supp II 2002). 
 51. See Securities Act § 19(b); Rule 4-01(a) of Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-01 (2005). 
 52. See Facilitation of Multinational Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 6568, 50 
Fed. Reg. 9281, 9283 (1985). 
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SEC would accept IFRS financial statements, there continue to be 
impediments to doing so. First, the IASB does not have a mechanism for 
interpreting IFRS and Europe does not have a securities commission at the 
EU level which could undertake such a task. Because there are now 25 
member states of the EU it is unclear whether IFRS will be consistently 
interpreted. If IFRS is not consistently interpreted, it may be difficult for the 
SEC to accept IFRS as authoritative.53 
Second, auditing standards are not included in the IASB’s mandate and 
these vary considerably. There is no international body to oversee auditing. 
The establishment of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) in the United States pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley, makes 
convergence of auditing standards between the United States and EU 
subject to some new and difficult dynamics. The EU Commission’s 
proposal for a directive on statutory audits has been justified as “a basis for 
effective and balanced international regulatory cooperation with oversight 
bodies of third countries such as the [PCAOB].”54 Although the PCAOB 
and the EU have worked out some of the problems with regard to the 
registration and inspection of foreign auditing firms which work on SEC 
filings, European issuers were left with a negative feeling regarding these 
problems.55 
An agreement between the Chairman of the SEC and the Internal 
Market Commissioner for the EU as to a roadmap to end the need for EU 
issuers to continue to reconcile to U.S. GAAP was reached in 2005.56 Then 
on February 27, 2006, European and U.S. accounting rule-makers 
announced a new memorandum of understanding regarding convergence of 
U.S. GAAP and IFRS. The agreement set forth their plan to develop a 
common set of standards over the next two years, rather than eliminating 
differences between their standards.57 The SEC staff is now examining 
financial statements reported in IFRS to determine the extent to which they 
                                                                                                                 
 53. See Nazareth Remarks, supra note 47. 
 54. See Commission Proposal for a Directive on Statutory Audit of Annual Accounts and 
Consolidated Accounts and Amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC, COM 
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 56. See Press Release, SEC, Chairman Donaldson Meets with EU Internal Market 
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converge with U.S. GAAP. Although IFRS and U.S. GAAP are converging, 
there are still significant differences between these two systems.58 
Foreign companies do not want to become subject to U.S. accounting 
and auditing rules. The CEOs of both the NYSE and Euronext have stated 
that U.S. accounting regulations would not be extended to European 
companies as a result of the NYSE-Euronext merger.59 The SEC is aware of 
this strongly felt view and has attempted to reassure foreign issuers listed 
on Euronext that they will not become subject to the SEC reporting 
requirements merely because they are listed on Euronext.60 The U.S. 
litigation system is also anathema to foreign issuers. While the SEC may 
attempt to reassure foreign issuers that the SEC will not impose registration 
requirements on them, the SEC cannot exempt foreign issuers from the 
reach of the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws. Yet, as long as EU 
issuers have a significant number of U.S. security holders, they become 
subject to suit under the anti-fraud provisions whether or not they are listed 
in the United States.61 
D. DEREGISTRATION OF FOREIGN ISSUERS 
European and other foreign issuers have been vociferous in 
complaining about their inability to exit the SEC disclosure system if and 
when they no longer wish to have their shares listed or traded in the United 
States. The desire of foreign issuers to deregister may arise because of flow 
back of their securities to their home markets and an unsatisfactory trading 
record in the U.S. markets. Alternatively, it may be due to the reluctance of 
foreign issuers to become subject to the corporate governance listing 
standards imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley or the need to comply with the 
section 404 internal controls provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley. 
                                                                                                                 
 58. See Deming, supra note 49, at 367–68; see generally PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 
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Parmalat Finanziaria Agrees to Entry of Permanent Injunction and Corporate Undertakings, SEC 
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184, SEC, Commission Settles Civil Fraud Action Against Vivendi Universal, S.A., Its Former 
CEO, Jean-Marie Messier, and Its Former CFO, Guillaume Hannezo (Dec. 23, 2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-184.htm. 
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Bowing to the pressure from foreign issuers, the SEC has proposed 
rules allowing a foreign issuer to terminate its registration under the 
Exchange Act and to cease its reporting obligations regarding a class of 
equity or debt securities under certain conditions.62 Currently, in order to 
exit the SEC reporting regime, a foreign private issuer generally must, 
among other things, certify that it has fewer than 300 resident U.S. 
shareholders, and it must look through the record ownership of its shares to 
make this determination.63 The SEC has issued a proposal to make de-
registration no longer turn on the number of U.S. residents holding a 
foreign issuer’s shares. Whether this proposed rule would permit very many 
foreign issuers to exit the SEC disclosure system is questionable. A better 
solution would probably be to exempt foreign issuers from the corporate 
governance provisions and section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley, but this solution 
seems politically infeasible at this time.64 Nevertheless, the SEC has issued 
a Concept Release in an effort to make section 404 compliance less costly 
and more practicable for all public companies, and implementation of some 
of the ideas in this release could alleviate some of the tensions between the 
SEC and foreign issuers.65 
Over the long term, one would hope that there will be greater regulatory 
convergence between the SEC and European regulators with regard to 
disclosure and corporate governance policy for foreign issuers, but thus far 
this has not occurred. Disclosure regulation has become somewhat more 
compatible under the influence of IOSCO and recent EU directives, but 
corporate governance regimes within Europe and in Europe and the United 
States are still far apart.66 Whether a merger between the NYSE and 
Euronext would help to spur such convergence is an interesting question. 
One would hope so. 
III. FOREIGN EXCHANGE ACCESS 
A. THE DEMAND FOR ACCESS 
A persistent idea for cutting through the regulatory red tape, when a 
foreign issuer lists on a U.S. exchange, is foreign exchange access. So far 
                                                                                                                 
 62. See Termination of a Foreign Private Issuer’s Registration of a Class of Securities Under 
Section 12(g) and Duty to File Reports Under Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
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this idea has been persistently rejected by the SEC.67 Until recently, stock 
exchanges were floor-based membership organizations that traded primarily 
domestic securities. Today, however, stock exchanges compete for 
international listings.68 Further, stock exchanges around the world have 
become electronic markets and no longer have floors.69 Even the NYSE, the 
last major exchange with a trading floor, after its merger with Archipelago 
Holdings, Inc. (Arca)70 is creating a hybrid market and may eventually 
become an electronic exchange.71 Financial regulators, and the SEC in 
particular, have only begun to address the problems of regulating such 
cyber-markets.72 
Foreign exchanges which now engage in screen trading have been 
desirous of placing their screens in the United States and signing up U.S. 
members, without registering as exchanges with the SEC and without 
requiring all of their listed companies to become registered and reporting 
companies in the United States pursuant to the Exchange Act.73 Former EU 
Commissioner Frits Bolkestein strongly advocated a transatlantic financial 
community that would permit foreign market access in the United States by 
European exchanges based on the principle of mutual recognition.74 Some 
critics of the SEC and the NYSE have suggested that the SEC’s refusal to 
allow free access to foreign exchanges is protectionist and anti-
competitive.75 SEC Commissioner Roel C. Campos responded to pressure 
for foreign market access by explaining that the SEC “imposes significant 
regulatory requirements on exchanges, as well as on issuers who list on 
those exchanges, whether foreign or domestic. The exemptions being 
requested by some foreign exchanges would create access to U.S. investors 
on different terms than those available to U.S. exchanges. This, in turn, puts 
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2007] Regulation of Global Exchanges 369 
considerable stress on our system of regulation, disrupting the level playing 
field we have created for all market participants.”76 
There are two problems with regard to giving foreign securities 
exchanges access to the United States. The first is how to fit such 
exchanges into national market system (NMS) regulation. Domestic 
electronic communications networks (ECNs) or alternative trading systems 
(ATSs) have been brought into the NMS regulatory framework through the 
adoption of Regulation ATS77 and a revised definition of the term 
“exchange” under the Exchange Act.78 In its concept release proposing that 
ATSs should either register as exchanges or undertake new responsibilities 
as broker-dealers, the SEC addressed the problem of foreign exchanges 
wishing to access the U.S. capital markets.79 As the SEC suggested in its 
concept release, today’s technology enables market participants to tap 
simultaneous and multiple sources of liquidity from remote locations.80 It is 
therefore possible for U.S. investors to obtain real-time information about 
trading on foreign markets from a number of different sources and to enter 
and execute their orders on those markets electronically from the United 
States.81 
The second major problem preventing foreign stock exchange access is 
that thousands of foreign securities, which are not registered with the SEC 
and whose issuers do not meet SEC disclosure and accounting standards, 
would become tradeable.82 The SEC has suggested several possible 
solutions to this problem. First, the SEC could subject foreign exchanges to 
registration as “exchanges” under the Exchange Act and prevent them from 
trading any securities not registered with the SEC under the Exchange Act. 
Second, the SEC could limit cross-border trading by ECNs, ATSs, or 
foreign exchanges seeking U.S. investors to operations through an access 
provider which would be a U.S. broker-dealer or ECN. Third, the SEC 
could limit trading in foreign securities by foreign exchanges to transactions 
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with sophisticated U.S. investors so that some exemption from Securities 
Act registration might be available.83 
In granting an exemption from registration as an exchange to 
Tradepoint Financial Networks plc (Tradepoint) so it could operate a 
limited volume securities exchange in the United States, the SEC combined 
these various approaches.84 Tradepoint was an electronic market maker 
system that allowed investors to trade securities listed on the LSE. The 
company also proposed to operate a specialist system for certain securities. 
The basis on which the SEC allowed Tradepoint to put its screens into the 
United States had two important limitations. Tradepoint had two levels of 
service for its members: one for the public market and one only to qualified 
institutional buyers (QIBs) as defined in Rule 144A.85 Bids and offers for 
securities not registered under the Exchange Act could be made only by 
QIBs, and any such securities could only be resold outside the United 
States.86 Further, access was effectively limited to broker-dealers and other 
sophisticated investors.87 
While the SEC, as a practical matter, may currently be able to limit 
access to the U.S. markets by foreign exchanges to transactions with QIBs 
or other institutional investors, or to trading only in Exchange Act 
registered securities, this may not always be the best approach. As ECNs 
proliferate and retail investors become interested in buying foreign 
securities on foreign exchanges in the middle of the night, the SEC may 
find the approach it adopted in the Tradepoint exemption difficult to 
maintain and try some other approach to the problem of foreign exchange 
access. 
B. TRANSPARENCY OF QUOTES AND PRICES 
Since the SEC’s Concept Release discussing foreign exchange access, 
the problems involved in allowing foreign exchanges into the United States 
have become even more intractable because the SEC has passed Regulation 
NMS,88 and the EU has passed the Markets in Financial Instruments 
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Directive (MiFID).89 Although both laws are to some extent aimed at 
enforcing best execution obligations in the face of the threat of 
internalization and fragmentation90 of securities price discovery 
mechanisms, they are based on different legal systems, and they are not 
necessarily compatible. 
Regulation NMS is the most far reaching market structure initiative of 
the SEC since the 1970s. It is comprised of four new market structure rules 
reaffirming the SEC’s interpretation of its mandate to facilitate the 
establishment of a national market system, as promoting a balance between 
fair competition among individual markets and assuring that such markets 
are linked together in a unified system that promotes interaction among 
orders in an NMS stock.91 The four rules are: (1) an order protection rule; 
(2) an access rule; (3) a sub-penny rule (not relevant to this Article); and (4) 
market data rules and plans. 
The SEC’s mandate to facilitate the establishment of the NMS was 
added to the Exchange Act in 1975.92 In a 1978 Policy Statement, the SEC 
asserted that Congress supported three major principles when directing the 
SEC to facilitate the development of the NMS. These were: (1) creating an 
ideal auction type market by implementing a nationwide system according 
to price and time priority for all limit orders of public investors over all 
professional orders; (2) the types of securities qualified to be included in an 
NMS should depend on their characteristics rather than where they were 
traded; and (3) a refusal to achieve a nationwide centralized auction-type 
market for qualified securities by abolishing over-the-counter trading in 
listed securities.93 The SEC put down several building blocks for the NMS 
in the late 1970s, including: (1) the development of a composite quotation 
system; (2) the development of comprehensive market linkage and order 
routing systems in the form of the Intermarket Trading System (ITS); (3) a 
recommendation that all agency orders in NMS securities receive the 
benefit of auction-type trading protections; (4) the elimination of off-board 
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trading prohibitions; and (5) a consolidated transaction reporting system. 
Regulation NMS is an effort to update this vision in light of changes in the 
markets over the last quarter of a century. 
The most controversial part of Regulation NMS is the order protection 
rule, also known as the trade-through rule,94 which establishes intermarket 
protection against trade-throughs for all NMS stocks.95 A trade-through is 
the execution of an order by one trading center at a price that is inferior to 
the price of a protected quotation, often representing an investor limit order, 
displayed by another trading center.96 The trade-through rule protects only 
quotations that are immediately accessible through automatic execution, 
and thereby eliminates any potential advantage that manual or floor based 
markets had over automated markets in the ITS system. The trade-through 
rule applies to all trading centers, including Nasdaq and broker-dealers 
acting as off-exchange block positioners in exchange listed stocks.97 A 
protected bid or protected offer is an automated quotation displayed by an 
automated trading center that is the best bid or best offer of an exchange or 
Nasdaq.98 
The SEC justified the order protection rule on the ground that it will 
encourage greater use of limit orders, which will help improve the price 
discovery process and contribute to increased liquidity and depth in the 
securities markets.99 To the extent that conflicts between short-term and 
long-term investors occur in trading markets, the SEC opted to protect long-
term investors by attempting to minimize volatility.100 The SEC also 
asserted that the rule will promote intermarket competition by leveling the 
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playing field between automated and non-automated markets.101 According 
to the SEC, the trade-through rule does not lessen the duty of best 
execution, which “requires broker-dealers to execute customers’ trades at 
the most favorable terms reasonably available under the circumstances.”102 
The SEC does not view the duty of best execution as inconsistent with 
manual routing, but believes that broker-dealers must take into account 
price improvement execution possibilities. According to the SEC, the new 
order protection rule undergirds the duty of best-execution by helping to 
ensure that customers’ orders are not executed at prices inferior to the best 
protected quotations.103 
Protecting the best displayed prices against trade-throughs necessitates 
giving broker-dealers and trading centers fair and efficient access to 
quotations. The access rule104 is designed to promote access to quotations in 
three ways. First, it enables the use of private linkages, rather than 
mandating a collective linkage facility such as ITS. Using private linkages, 
market participants may obtain indirect access to quotations displayed by a 
trading center through the members, subscribers or customers of that 
trading center.105 Second, the access rule limits the fees that any trading 
center can charge for accessing its protected quotations.106 Third, the rule 
requires SROs to have rules that prohibit their members from displaying 
quotations that lock or cross protected quotations of other markets.107 
Regulation NMS also updates the requirements for consolidating, 
distributing and displaying market information and amends the joint 
industry plans for disseminating market information. The allocation of 
market data revenues by exchanges and Nasdaq has been a source of 
controversy for some time.108 In Regulation NMS, the SEC declined to go 
to a model based on market forces, taking the view that investors, and 
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particularly retail investors, benefit from the current consolidated system.109 
The Regulation NMS amendments to the joint industry plans110 are 
designated to strengthen the existing market data system and preserve its 
integrity and affordability. The amendments update the formulas for 
allocating revenues generated by market data fees to the various SRO 
participants in the plans, based on the usefulness to investors of each SRO’s 
market information, rather than the number of trades. The amendments also 
broaden participation in the governance of the plans by creating advisory 
committees composed of non-SRO representatives. The amendments also 
promote the wide availability of market data by authorizing markets to 
distribute their own data independently of the plans.111 
Although Regulation NMS attempted to settle market structure issues 
for the near term, it has not yet become fully effective112 and it accelerated 
so many changes in the configuration of the trading markets that it may be 
obsolete before it is implemented. Immediately after Regulation NMS was 
adopted, the NYSE merged with Arca113 and Nasdaq acquired the ECN of 
Instinet Group, Inc.114—transactions that can be attributed at least in part to 
the importance Regulation NMS put on automated trading systems. Other 
consolidations among exchanges, in Europe as well as in the United States, 
are also reactions to the new regulations affecting the trading markets. 
MiFID, like Regulation NMS, is a far reaching regulation designed to 
eliminate national rules which concentrate trading on official stock 
exchanges and enable real competition between different market execution 
centers, through pre- and post-trade transparency rules. It is part of the EU’s 
Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP), and it will replace the Investment 
Services Directive (ISD), passed in 1993. MiFID was intended to promote a 
single market for both wholesale and retail transactions in financial 
instruments. It sets forth requirements for investment advice, the operation 
of multilateral trading facilities (MTFs) and services related to commodity 
derivatives.115 This will give financial services firms more reliable passports 
for cross-border activity than existed under the ISD. The substantial 
changes MiFID is expected to make include a broader definition of 
“investment advice,” client classification criteria, a revised approach for 
dealing with conflicts of interest, a new approach to best execution, and 
new requirements in relation to equity market transparency, especially for 
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“systematic internalisers.”116 The trading transparency requirements and 
their application to internalisers have proved particularly controversial, and 
such controversy resonates with respect to the controversies over the trade 
through rule in the United States. 
In 1993, when the ISD was adopted, securities trading in Europe was 
conducted on stock exchanges, also called “regulated markets,” or by way 
of block trades executed upstairs by securities dealers. At that time, there 
was considerable controversy over a requirement to “concentrate” 
transactions on exchanges. Over a decade later, MiFID formally recognized 
the role of MTFs and directly addressed the responsibilities of “systematic 
internalisers.” An MTF is defined as “a multilateral system, operated by an 
investment firm or a market operator, which brings together multiple third-
party buying and selling interests in financial instruments . . . in a way that 
results in a contract . . . .”117 A “systematic internaliser” is defined as “an 
investment firm which, on an organised, frequent and systematic basis, 
deals on own account by executing client orders outside a regulated market 
or an MFT.”118 In 1993, when the ISD was adopted, competition between 
exchanges and MFTs were relatively unknown in Europe. Further, 
internalization was not common. Today, in jurisdictions where there is no 
concentration rule requiring orders to be brought to regulated markets, the 
EU Commission estimates that fifteen to thirty per cent of orders are 
internalized.119 Since the MiFID abolishes the concentration rule, 
internalization may increase. 
The political compromise that led to the abolition of the concentration 
rule, however, was the adoption of strict transparency rules.120 Such rules 
will not only apply to regulated markets, but also to MFTs and investment 
firms. All of these rules are related to best execution responsibilities. The 
MiFID obligates EU member states to require that investment firms take all 
reasonable steps to obtain, when executing orders, the best possible result 
for their clients.121 This best execution standard can take into account price, 
costs, speed, likelihood of execution and settlement, size, nature, or other 
considerations relevant to order execution. Nevertheless, order handling and 
transparency rules limit the ability of investment firms to internalize orders. 
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Member states must require investment firms to execute customer orders 
according to procedures or arrangements which provide for the “prompt, 
fair and expeditious execution of client orders, relative to other client orders 
or the trading interests of the investment firm.”122 These procedures must 
allow for the execution of comparable orders according to time priority. In 
the case of a client limit order, if an order in listed shares is not immediately 
executed, unless the client otherwise directs, the investment firm must make 
the order public in a manner which is easily accessible to other participants. 
This may mean sending the order to an exchange or MTF.123 
Regulated markets are required to make public, on reasonable 
commercial terms and on a continuous basis, current bid and offer prices 
and the depth of trading interests at those prices which are advertised 
through their systems.124 In addition to such pre-trade transparency, 
regulated markets must publish the price, volume, and time for all equity 
trades executed in listed equities.125 In order to ensure fair, orderly, and 
transparent operations, and fair access to regulated markets, the MiFID sets 
forth organizational requirements for such markets.126 
The MiFID also requires systematic internalisers to publish a firm quote 
in listed shares for which they are internalisers and for which there is a 
liquid market. These quotes must be made available on a regular and 
continuous basis during normal trading hours.127 Time priority is set forth as 
a standard for best execution. Nevertheless, systematic internalisers are 
allowed to decide, on a commercial basis, but in an objective and non-
discriminatory way, the investors to whom they will give access to their 
quotes. Accordingly, systematic internalisers may decide to give access to 
their quotes only to retail clients, only to professional clients, or both, 
providing they do not discriminate within those categories.128 One of the 
permitted methods for making quotes available is through a regulated 
market or exchange. Post-trade, as well as pre-trade disclosure, is mandated. 
Member states must require investment firms which effect transactions in 
listed shares off an exchange or MTF to make public the volume and price 
of those transactions and the time at which they were concluded. Further, 
this information must be made public on a real-time basis in a manner 
easily accessible to other market participants.129 MTFs are similarly subject 
to pre-trade and post-trade transparency requirements.130 
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As pointed out by the U.S. Securities Industry Association (SIA), in a 
comment letter to the EU on an earlier draft of the MiFID, best execution 
and pre-trade and post-trade transparency requirements in the United States 
are “inextricably linked to the information and trading infrastructure in the 
United States,” including the consolidated quotation system, the 
consolidated tape, intermarket linkages, automatic order routing and 
execution systems, electronic communication networks and a central 
clearing and settlement system.131 Although regulations can remove barriers 
to competition, they cannot create market linkages. The MiFID asserts that 
fair competition requires that market participants and investors be able to 
compare the prices that intermediaries and trading venues must publish, but 
then merely recommends that Member States “remove any obstacles which 
may prevent consolidation at European level of the relevant information and 
its publication.”132 Similarly, the MiFID provides that Member States 
require that investment firms from other Member States have the right of 
membership or access to regulated markets in their territories, as well as the 
right of access to central counterparty, clearing, and settlement systems in 
their territories.133 
MiFID is part of the FSAP, which consists of a series of policy 
objectives and specific measures to improve the single market for financial 
services in the EU. It is comprised of forty-two separate measures designed 
to harmonize EU Member States’ regulation of securities, banking, 
insurance, mortgages, pensions and all other forms of financial 
transactions.134 The goal of the FSAP is to create integrated, efficient, deep, 
and liquid financial markets in the EU in order to deliver a broad range of 
safe and competitive products to consumers and to achieve easier access to 
a single market for investment capital. Among the priorities of the FSAP 
are: revising the common legal framework for integrated securities and 
derivatives markets; removing outstanding barriers to raising capital on an 
EU-wide basis; ensuring the continued stability of the European markets; 
moving toward a single set of financial statements for listed European 
companies; creating a secure and transparent environment for cross-border 
restructuring; and providing legal security for cross-border security 
trading.135 
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One of the effects of the FSAP has been a consolidation of stock 
exchanges within Europe, of which Euronext is an example. While each 
exchange within Euronext operates as a separate subsidiary in its own 
country, governed and licensed by local regulators, all exchanges within 
Euronext have centralized their trading operations.136 They utilize a 
common trading platform to create a single trading price for each security, 
and a broker-member of Euronext is able to trade all securities listed on any 
of the subsidiary exchanges.137 
As can be seen, the goals and politics of Regulation NMS and the 
MiFID are quite disparate. Further, the history of exchanges in the United 
States and Europe and the problems of reconciling competition between 
evolving market centers—ATSs in U.S. terminology and MTFs in EU 
terminology—and maintaining best execution, especially for retail 
customers, is different in the two jurisdictions. Although both Regulation 
NMS and MiFID are efforts by regulators to incorporate ECNs into the 
equity trading markets, they approach this task differently, in part because 
the SEC traditionally has been more concerned about protecting retail 
investors and European regulators have been more concerned about 
preserving the wholesale markets. Accordingly, Regulation NMS includes 
ECNs in its trade-through requirements in a way which prodded exchanges 
and ECNs to consolidate, whereas in Europe ECNs were permitted to 
continue to deal with institutional investors outside of MiFID’s 
transparency requirements.138 Ironically, many of the major players in the 
European capital markets are affiliates of U.S. investment banks, and to 
some extent their trading activities in both the United States and Europe are 
in competition with the NYSE. The NYSE’s efforts to expand into Europe 
should be viewed in the context of this competition. 
Exchanges and their members are now confronted with the challenges 
of complying with both Regulation NMS and MiFID. Perhaps a merger 
between the NYSE and Euronext could precipitate a movement to 
harmonize or converge Regulation NMS and the MiFID. However, this is 
an unlikely prospect because of the tremendous complexity of both 
regulations and their differing treatment of institutional orders. An 
interesting question is whether the NYSE and Euronext will be able to 
construct a single trading platform to realize the synergies of their merger in 
the face of the different requirements of Regulation NMS and the MiFID. 
The Deputy Director of the SEC’s Division of Market Regulation had 
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questioned how a common trading platform would be developed without 
significant regulatory change.139 
IV. THE POLICIES OF THE CFTC 
A. CROSS-BORDER ACTIVITIES 
Commodity exchanges began to negotiate cross-border linkages prior to 
such transactions between security exchanges. In 1984, the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange (CME) and the Singapore Monetary Exchange 
(SIMEX) instituted their mutual offset system, the first international linkage 
between exchanges.140 In 1987, in conjunction with Reuters Holdings PLC, 
the CME pioneered GLOBEX, the first worldwide after hours electronic 
trading system.141 In 1995, the CME launched the Growth and Emerging 
Markets (GEM) division to provide access to investment in emerging 
market countries.142 In 1998, the CME launched GLOBEX2 based on a 
technology swap with the Paris Bourse and MATIF.143 
Then in early 1998, Eurex, the all-electronic German/Swiss derivatives 
exchange, began talks with the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) regarding 
a joint venture to create a single global electronic trading system.144 Two 
years later, CBOT members voted to discontinue the proposed alliance only 
to reconsider it six months later. Finally, on August 28, 2000, the CBOT 
Eurex Alliance was launched.145 But this venture floundered, and on 
January 10, 2003, Eurex, the world’s largest derivatives exchange, 
announced plans to open a U.S. exchange in Chicago.146 Establishing a U.S. 
exchange was designed to allow Eurex to directly offer U.S. products such 
as U.S. Treasury securities, challenging older U.S. exchanges such as the 
CBOT and the CME.147 
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Shortly after the Eurex announcement, the CBOT and the CME went to 
Washington. Testifying before the U.S. House Agricultural Committee and 
the CFTC, the CBOT and the CME urged that Eurex’s application to 
become a registered U.S. futures exchange be carefully reviewed. The 
Chicago exchanges raised concerns over the potential lack of transparency 
in the Eurex model, and questioned Eurex’s compliance with U.S. law since 
some market surveillance functions would be performed in Europe.148 
Ultimately, these efforts proved unsuccessful as the CFTC later designated 
Eurex—by way of its subsidiary, the U.S. Futures Exchange, L.L.C. 
(USFE)—a contract market for the automated trading of futures and options 
on futures contracts.149 While Eurex was successful in establishing a U.S. 
exchange, it failed in its attempt to win CBOT’s U.S. Treasury futures 
market. In 2005, Eurex announced that it would shift its focus to foreign 
exchange futures, rather than commit to treasuries. Some suggested that the 
CBOT’s efforts against Eurex’s entrance into the U.S. market may have 
bought it enough time to mount a competitive response, which has allowed 
CBOT to remain the top U.S. Treasury exchange.150 
Eurex is not the only European exchange raising hackles at U.S. 
commodity exchanges. The IntercontinentalExchange, Inc. (ICE) is an 
electronic trading network based in Atlanta, which matches buyers and 
sellers of energy contracts around the world. After being rebuffed by the 
New York Mercantile Exchange (Nymex), when Nymex was offered an 
investment in ICE, ICE began to compete with Nymex. Then ICE 
purchased the International Petroleum Exchange in London, best known for 
trading Brent crude oil futures, which was regulated in the United 
Kingdom. ICE then shut down its trading floor, and continued to operate 
under the aegis of the U.K. Financial Services Authority in the United 
States.151 It could do so because of CFTC policies, which will be explained 
below. 
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B. CFTC INITIATIVES 
The CFTC permits a foreign commodities exchange to install an 
electronic trading terminal in the United States based on various conditions 
and representations by that foreign exchange as to how it will conduct 
trading. This policy dates back to 1999, when the CFTC instructed its staff 
to process “no-action letter” requests from foreign boards of trade seeking 
to place terminals in the United States.152 The first of these letters, issued 
prior to this policy statement, was given to Eurex.153 
In 2000, the CFTC issued a policy statement allowing foreign boards of 
trade that had placed automated trading systems in the United States to list 
certain additional futures and options contracts without further regulatory 
approvals.154 However, because of differences in philosophy between the 
CFTC and the SEC, which have shared jurisdiction over security futures, 
financial regulators were unable to reach agreement on rules that would 
allow security futures listed on foreign exchanges to be traded in the United 
States.155 CFTC commissioners advocated cooperation across markets and 
national borders to deal more efficiently and effectively with expanding 
global markets and advances in technology. On May 15, 2006, the CFTC 
and the Committee of European Securities Regulators published online 
guides for conducting derivatives business in the United States and the 
EU.156 
This internationalism has been interrupted by the complaints of Nymex 
that it is a victim of unfair competition from ICE. In January 2006, the 
CFTC approved, over Nymex’s objection, ICE’s application to list West 
Texas crude oil futures—the U.S. benchmark which Nymex trades—
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without U.S. regulation. ICE’s West Texas contract, unlike Nymex’s, does 
not involve physical delivery of oil, but rather it is limited to cash 
settlements of each contract tied to the price of West Texas oil on Nymex. 
Nymex, unsuccessfully, went to court claiming that its prices were 
trademarked and could not be copied by a rival exchange.157 Nymex now 
claims that the CFTC should not allow ICE the unfair advantage of looser 
U.K. regulations that impose no limit on the size of positions that investors 
can take. As a result of this regulatory loophole, hedge funds have 
abandoned Nymex for ICE, which has captured almost a third of the 
market.158 Nymex points out that ICE is currently enjoying less stringent 
U.K. regulations through no-action relief despite the fact that it is based in 
the United States (and no longer runs a physical exchange in London), and 
ICE’s contracts are based on a product that is produced, stored, and 
delivered in New York.159 
The dispute between Nymex and ICE highlights the ambiguity  
of CFTC’s no-action relief. The CFTC has never defined “the point at 
which . . . [a foreign board of trade] that makes its products available for 
trading in the U.S. [through an] . . . electronic trading system . . . is no 
longer ‘located outside the U.S.’ for purposes” of CFTC regulation.160 
While most foreign boards of trade that are granted no-action relief are 
regulated abroad, some foreign exchanges, such as Eurex, are subject to 
U.S. regulation. The CFTC therefore scheduled a public hearing for June 
27, 2006 addressing this issue.161 At the opening of the hearing, one of the 
CFTC commissioners remarked that “[d]etermining where an [electronic] 
exchange is located is difficult, if not impossible.”162 
                                                                                                                 
 157. See Gillian Tett, Stock Markets and Currencies: ICE-Nymex Saga Exposes New Problems 
for Regulation, FIN. TIMES (London), June 16, 2006, at 38. 
 158. See Wysocki & Lucchetti, supra note 151; Jeremy Grant and Gillian Tett, Capital Markets 
and Commodities, FIN. TIMES (London), June 27, 2006, at 45. 
 159. Senator Charles Schumer expressed concern that, without U.S. regulations, purchasers on 
ICE could potentially drive the price of oil up to $100/barrel or higher. In response, ICE argues 
that oil is a globally traded commodity, and U.S. and U.K. regulators have information-sharing 
agreements and a strong working relationship. See Wysocki & Lucchetti, supra note 151, at A1. 
Since the CFTC has authorized ICE to list West Texas under U.K. regulations, Nymex has 
launched its own electronic trading of twelve energy contracts on the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange’s Globex platform. The strong early reports by Nymex coupled with the possibility that 
the CFTC might tighten regulation of ICE suggest that Nymex might soon recapture the West 
Texas market share it lost earlier this year. See Gerelyn Terzo, A Bad Week for the ICE: Shares 
Fall as Rival Nymex Goes Electronic and CFTC Considers a Tighter Rein, INV. DEALERS’ DIG., 
June 19, 2006. This saga continues as ICE has agreed to purchase the New York Board of Trade. 
See Aaron Lucchetti & Susan Buchanan, ICE Agrees to Buy Nybot, Whose Members Will Meet to 
Weigh Offer, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2006, at C3. 
 160. Boards of Trade Located Outside of the United States and the Requirement to Become a 
Designated Contract Market or Derivatives Transaction Execution Facility, 71 Fed. Reg. 34,070 
(June 13, 2006). 
 161. See id. 
 162. Bernard Wyosocki, CFTC Wrestles With Regulatory Turf In Age of Electronic Futures 
Trading, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2006, at C1. 
2007] Regulation of Global Exchanges 383 
If one of the major purposes of the NYSE-Euronext merger is to 
capture the derivatives trading on LIFFE for U.S. investors, this 
jurisdictional hassle could become critical. Would LIFFE continue to be 
regulated by the Financial Services Authority in London, or would it come 
under the jurisdiction of the CFTC? This controversy also holds a lesson for 
the SEC. If the SEC were to reverse some of its prior policies and allow 
foreign exchange access so that Eurex could place terminals in the United 
States for direct trading access, such a policy would give thousands of 
foreign issuers not registered with the SEC direct trading access to the U.S. 
capital markets. U.S. issuers might complain and businesses that think such 
a policy would be a competitive threat might sue. If Congress became 
involved, internationalism would likely give way to nationalism. On the 
other hand, the business most likely to be at a competitive disadvantage in 
such a scenario is the NYSE itself because foreign issuers would have much 
less of an incentive to list on the NYSE. 
V. THE FUTURE OF SELF-REGULATION BY THE NYSE 
A. THE HISTORIC ROLE OF SELF-REGULATION 
The NYSE was an SRO prior to the adoption of the federal securities 
laws. While the SEC has assumed greater responsibility for the regulation 
of listed companies, exchange members and trading markets than was once 
the case, Euronext has ceded most of its SRO functions to government 
regulators. The anticipation of a NYSE and Euronext merger raises a 
question as to whether the NYSE will be able to continue functioning as an 
SRO to the same extent as it does presently. This question is already in the 
air because of other developments. 
Prior to the enactment of the Exchange Act, stock exchanges were 
private membership organizations under state law. When the federal 
securities laws were passed, stock exchanges were required to register with 
the SEC.163 The SEC thus obtained oversight authority over stock 
exchanges, but the stock exchanges continued to have rulemaking and 
regulatory authority with respect to their members, their trading markets 
and their listed companies. Before 1934 no analogue to stock exchanges for 
the over-the-counter (OTC) market existed, but in 1938 Congress passed 
the Maloney Act to establish a framework for an OTC SRO.164 Only one 
such association, the NASD, exists for OTC brokers and dealers. All 
broker-dealers registered with the SEC, except those doing business 
exclusively on a securities exchange, are required to join the NASD.165 
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Although the efficacy of self-regulation was called into question by 
stock market abuses reported in the 1963 SEC Special Study,166 that Study 
concluded that self-regulation should be maintained and strengthened.167 
The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975168 further enlarged the SEC’s 
oversight role over the stock exchanges and the NASD by, among other 
things, giving the SEC the power to initiate, as well as approve, SRO 
rulemaking,169 expanding the SEC’s role in SRO enforcement and 
discipline,170 and by allowing the SEC to play an active role in structuring 
the market.171 For the first time, the statute set forth requirements with 
respect to the composition of exchange and association boards of 
directors.172 
Sarbanes-Oxley both diminished and strengthened self-regulation. On 
the one hand, the SEC was authorized to administer regulations regarding 
aspects of corporate governance that previously had been left to state law.173 
On the other hand, many of the new corporate governance regulations were 
imposed upon public companies by way of NYSE listing requirements 
dictated by Sarbanes-Oxley and the SEC. The SRO listing rules, as 
approved by the SEC implementing Sarbanes-Oxley, include provisions 
mandating executive sessions of non-management directors, define 
committee independence for audit and nominating committee members, 
define audit committee financial experts, set forth specific size requirements 
and obligations of the audit committee, and require companies to have 
codes of business conduct and ethics.174 Continuing education for directors 
is suggested.175 
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In Europe, implementation of the EU’s securities law directives—
starting with the ISD in the early 1990s, and more recently the FSAP 
directives—have resulted in the creation of new and strengthened national 
securities regulators. Regulatory functions previously exercised by stock 
exchanges with respect to listed companies and trading members are now 
exercised by government commissions. This change in the balance between 
government and self-regulation was a by-product of the harmonization of 
the securities laws and the requirements for their enforcement. The ISD, the 
Insider Dealing Directive, the Public Offering Prospectus Directive and the 
Market Abuse Directive all require supervision and enforcement by 
government securities regulators.176 Referring to the likelihood of a 
transatlantic combination of exchanges, and the differences between U.S. 
and foreign regulation, SEC Commissioner Annette L. Nazareth stated: 
If, in an international market, the jurisdiction in which a company lists 
becomes less important, the SEC may not be able to impact corporate 
governance or effect other reforms through listing standards. And, even if 
foreign jurisdictions have strong corporate governance requirements, 
fundamental differences exist between U.S. and foreign reporting and 
disclosure regimes.177 
The same could probably be said for stock exchange regulation of its 
members and trading markets. 
B. THE ORGANIZATION AND REORGANIZATION OF THE NYSE 
Until 1972, the NYSE Constitution consisted of thirty-three members, 
composed of the chairman, the president, three representatives of the public 
and twenty eight members’ representatives. Significant changes were made 
to the NYSE Constitution in 1972, after the NYSE incorporated and 
adopted a new governance structure. When the NYSE was incorporated in 
1971, the SEC expressed some doubts as to whether this step would impair 
the effectiveness of the exchange as a self-regulator.178 By the time the 1975 
Act was passed Congress was not inclined to put rigorous corporate 
governance standards into the Exchange Act. In part, this was not necessary 
because the term “member” of an exchange was defined in such a way as to 
divorce it from the concept of a “seat”179 and the SEC was given plenary 
control over specialists’ activities.180 In addition, the SEC was given the 
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power to abrogate, amend or add to the rules of any SRO.181 Although self-
regulation was preserved, and in some ways strengthened, a new emphasis 
on competition, investor protection and fair procedures changed the manner 
in which exchanges and associations could operate. Access to the market 
was opened up182 and standards were put in place for the design of 
exchange and NASD rules and disciplinary proceedings.183 
With specific reference to exchange boards of directors, the Exchange 
Act was amended in 1975 to provide that the rules of an exchange must 
“assure a fair representation of its members in the selection of its directors 
and administration of its affairs and provide that one or more directors shall 
be representative of issuers and investors and not be associated with a 
member of the exchange, broker, or dealer.”184 A corresponding provision 
was inserted for associations.185 The House bill had required that exchanges 
and associations include public representatives and further required that 
these SROs appropriate sums for use of public directors to employ staff 
independent of the exchange or association, but such provisions were 
dropped in the conference committee.186 
The NYSE went beyond the requirements of the Exchange Act. Until 
its 2003–2004 reorganization, the NYSE had a constituency board 
composed of half public directors not associated with the securities 
industry, while the half that was so associated remained a constituency 
board.187 There were requirements for industry directors from firms that had 
substantial direct contact with securities customers, for specialist members 
and non-specialist floor members and geographical specifications.188 Most 
of the non-industry directors were associated with listed companies. 
Disciplinary matters were conducted by exchange committees. Appeals 
from disciplinary matters were heard by the committee for review, a board 
committee which acted for the NYSE board in deciding such appeals. The 
enforcement group was not organizationally separate from the rest of the 
NYSE staff. The SEC conducted regular oversight inspections of NYSE 
enforcement matters. 
On September 17, 2003, Richard Grasso resigned as chairman and CEO 
of the NYSE in the midst of a storm of criticism over his compensation. 
Public focus on his outsized retirement pay package obscured some of the 
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more fundamental issues the NYSE was then facing.189 At the time, the 
NYSE was examining its own corporate governance policies, at the behest 
of the SEC and the Council of Institutional Investors.190 The SIA had raised 
some serious questions about the future of self-regulation.191 Important 
changes in the securities trading markets and SEC market structure 
regulation threatened the way in which the NYSE had functioned for a very 
long time.192 Relevant to the NYSE’s continuation as an SRO were a series 
of major securities scandals concerning questionable and illegal behavior by 
securities firms and stock exchange specialists.193 The inquiry into trading 
ahead of customer orders and other problematic specialist activity raised 
questions not only about the NYSE’s effectiveness as a regulator, but also 
about the long term viability of the exchange’s floor trading system.194 
Almost as soon as John Reed was named Interim Chairman and CEO of 
the NYSE, a proposal was put forth to reorganize the NYSE’s board of 
directors and alter its enforcement arm. A reconstituted board of directors, 
of six to twelve members plus a chairman and CEO, was put into place.195 
All of the board members other than the CEO were required to be 
independent of management, members, and listed companies. This board 
was then given the responsibility for appointing a board of executives of 
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twenty-two members, responsive to the exchange’s various constituencies 
and comprised of institutional investors, listed company CEOs, lessor 
members, upstairs firm CEOs, specialist firm CEOs, floor brokers and the 
NYSE Chair and CEO.196 The board of executives meets with the board of 
directors at least six times a year to discuss exchange performance, 
membership issues, listed-company issues, and public issues relating to 
market structure and performance. This new structure took much of the 
“self” out of self-regulation. After this reorganization, John Reed remained 
Chairman; John Thain was appointed CEO by the new board.197 Richard 
Ketchum was shortly thereafter named Chief Regulatory Officer, and his 
office was structured so that he would report directly to the Regulatory 
Oversight & Regulatory Budget Committee of the NYSE board of directors, 
rather than to the NYSE’s CEO.198 
These governance changes set the stage for far reaching changes in the 
NYSE’s business model. In April 2005, the NYSE announced a plan to 
acquire Arca, a deal designed to transform the NYSE from a mutual 
organization to a public company.199 Due in part to litigation against the 
NYSE, this transaction was not completed until March 7, 2006, but in the 
meantime, NYSE Group was organized on May 2, 2005 as a holding 
company. NYSE Group now operates NYSE and NYSE Arca as two 
securities exchanges, the former, for the time being, continuing as an 
agency auction floor based marketplace, and the latter operating as an all-
electronic stock exchange.200 The planned NYSE Hybrid Market is 
designed to emulate, in a primarily automatic-execution environment, a 
traditional auction market.201 
Both NYSE and NYSE Arca are SROs. In connection with the merger 
of the NYSE and Arca, NYSE Regulation, Inc. (NYSE Regulation) was 
formed as a separate not-for-profit subsidiary of NYSE Group. It has a 
number of structural and governance features designed to ensure its 
independence, in addition to its separate non-for-profit form. Each director 
of NYSE Regulation, other than its CEO, must be independent and a 
majority of the members of NYSE Regulation’s board and its compensation 
nominating committees must be persons who are not directors of NYSE 
Group. Its programs are funded primarily through fees assessed directly on 
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member organizations.202 The regulatory activities of NYSE Regulation 
include: listed company compliance, member firm regulation, market 
surveillance, enforcement, and dispute resolution/arbitration.203 
Under the merger plan of NYSE and Euronext, a holding company 
would be formed. Initially this parent was to have twenty directors—eleven 
from NYSE Group and nine from Euronext. This was later changed to a 
board of twenty-two directors, with half from NYSE Group and half from 
Euronext. The current CEO of NYSE—John Thain—would become CEO 
of this new company and the current CEO of Euronext—Jean-Francois 
Theodore—would become deputy CEO. The current Chairman of Euronext 
would become the Chairman of the Board and the current Chairman of 
NYSE Group would become Deputy Chairman. The two exchanges would 
be run as distinctly separate companies.204 How NYSE Regulation would fit 
into this new corporate structure is unclear. Should it be completely 
separated from the NYSE as will be the case with the NASD and Nasdaq, 
or should it remain under the umbrellas of NYSE Group? Would there be 
any securities industry members or listed company executives on the board 
of directors? 
C. THE SEC’S CONCEPT RELEASE ON SELF-REGULATION 
The SEC has issued proposed governance rules for stock exchanges that 
would require that these SROs and any of their affiliates have boards with a 
majority of independent directors and that their nominating, governance, 
compensation, audit and regulatory oversight standing committees be 
composed of independent directors. These standing committees would be 
mandated, and the SEC sets forth in its proposal their minimum purposes 
and responsibilities.205 An “independent director” is defined as a director 
who has no material relationship with an exchange or affiliate of an 
exchange, any member of the exchange or affiliate of a member, or any 
issuer listed or traded on the exchange.206 Further, employment by an 
exchange or member within the past three years, or the receipt of $60,000 
by the director or an immediate family member from the exchange or a 
member within the past year makes a director not independent. There is a 
similar definition of an “independent director” for the NASD.207 This 
proposal is essentially based on the NYSE’s reorganized board as described 
above. 
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Section 6(b)(3) of the Exchange Act requires that the rules of an 
exchange assure a fair representation of its members in the selection of its 
directors and the administration of its affairs. Further, an exchange must 
provide that one or more directors be representative of issuers and investors 
and not be associated with a member of the exchange, broker or dealer.208 
Although the NYSE board of executives is a traditional constituency group, 
which has a fair representation of exchange members, it is an advisory 
board, not an operating board with ultimate decision making authority. The 
SEC’s rule proposal regarding exchange governance would require that the 
nominating committee of the board administer a fair process that provides 
members with the opportunity to select at least 20% of the total number of 
directors.209 The SEC asserts that the board could nevertheless be composed 
solely of independent directors, so long as 20% of those independent 
directors are selected by the exchange’s members. This may not be 
consonant with the statute, and in addition, it transforms the NYSE into an 
organization without securities industry members and therefore raises an 
issue as to whether it continues to be an SRO.210 
Both Nasdaq and the SIA strongly objected to the SEC’s proposal that 
exchange boards not include issuer or member firm representatives. Nasdaq 
argued that such a regulation would “either marginalize members and 
issuers or result in an unwieldy and excessively bureaucratic decision-
making process that is ill suited to a public company . . . .”211 The SIA 
argued that any governance reforms should be consistent with the balance 
between SEC oversight of SROs and regulation guided by the direct 
involvement of industry participants in both SRO and market functions.212 
In addition to mandating a board of independent directors, the SEC 
proposed that exchanges and associations must effectively separate their 
regulatory functions from their market operations and other commercial 
interests, use regulatory funds only to fund regulatory obligations and 
establish procedures to prevent the dissemination of regulatory information 
to third parties.213 In the SEC’s view, the conflicts between an exchange as 
a market operator and as a regulator, and as a membership organization and 
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as a regulator, are exacerbated if an exchange becomes demutualized and 
also has shareholders to whom it is responsible, and so separation of the 
regulatory component of an exchange or association’s functions is therefore 
necessary.214 The separation of the regulatory function of an SRO could be 
achieved by spinning off the regulatory organization into a separate entity, 
as is now the case at the NASD, though a functional separation within a 
single entity, or through a subsidiary of a holding company, as now the case 
at the NYSE. In either case, the SRO must appoint a chief regulatory officer 
who would report directly to the proposed independent regulatory oversight 
committee.215 
Another important part of the SEC’s proposal is a limitation on the 
amount of stock in an exchange or association that could be owned or voted 
by any one broker-dealer.216 The SEC also has proposed special rules for 
exchanges or associations that go public and list on their own boards.217 
Finally, the SEC has proposed a complete overhaul of the public disclosures 
made by exchanges and associations, as well as the disclosures made by 
them to the SEC on a confidential basis. Some of the disclosures that could 
be of interest include what proportion of an exchange or association’s total 
budget is devoted to regulatory expenses, as well as the dollar amounts of 
regulatory revenues and expenses. Other relevant financial information 
required to be disclosed on an annual basis would include revenues from 
regulation, transaction fees, market information fees, fines and penalties, 
listing fees and other fees paid by issuers, and investments.218 There has 
long been speculation about how different sources of exchange revenue 
contribute to an exchange’s operations and regulatory activities. Once such 
information is made public, some of the exchange’s constituents might well 
demand changes in how the exchange is run, especially if exchanges 
become public companies. 
The SEC’s current preoccupation with the conflicts between an 
exchange’s regulatory functions and its members, market operations, listed 
issuers, and shareholders prompted the issuance of a concept release on the 
future of SROs, in addition to the SEC’s rule proposals described above.219 
Although the concept release details these conflicts, it is worth noting that 
all of these conflicts have existed for many years, except for the conflict 
between an exchange’s regulatory functions and shareholders. Further, it 
can be argued that the conflicts between exchange regulatory functions and 
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shareholders is a less acute conflict than between exchange regulatory 
functions and members. What has changed is the context of self-regulation. 
In a global market where exchanges are public companies, it is difficult 
for them to continue to operate as SROs to the extent they have done so in 
the past. Further, the scandals of the past several years have raised serious 
questions about the ability of exchanges to regulate their members, their 
markets, or their listed companies. The SIA has been lobbying for a single 
regulator for broker-dealers in order to decrease the duplication and costs of 
regulation by several SROs.220 The latest iteration of this idea is for a hybrid 
SRO structure, where market regulation would remain with exchanges, but 
there would be one SRO to deal with broker-dealer issues currently handled 
by the NYSE and NASD.221 The NYSE now has a board with no securities 
industry members. While regulation has been delegated to NYSE 
Regulation, this non-profit subsidiary also does not have industry board 
members. Further, in Europe, its counterparts are government regulators. 
While good arguments can still be made for self-regulation as opposed to a 
system of direct government regulation, and SROs are deeply embedded in 
the U.S. system of securities regulation, if exchanges become global, 
regulators will also have to operate on a global level. Whether it is more 
efficient and effective for such regulators to be SROs rather than 
government agencies remains to be seen. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Both individual and institutional investors are purchasing securities 
abroad in record numbers.222 Although the securities markets have become 
global, the SEC’s policies remain focused on the construct of protecting 
U.S. investors by regulating U.S. public corporations and markets. Almost 
twenty years ago, the author made some recommendations to facilitate 
foreign issuer trading and listing in the United States. One of these 
recommendations was that the SEC should amend Rule 12g3-2 under the 
Exchange Act to permit any world class foreign issuer whose securities are 
traded on a principal foreign market, including listed companies, to be 
exempt from section 12 of the Exchange Act.223 Another recommendation 
was that the SEC should develop a new “wraparound form” for foreign 
issuers, recognizing international GAAP standards as “authoritative” within 
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the meaning of Rule 4-01 of Regulation S-X. The wraparound form would 
be designed for use as a Securities Act registration statement for multi-
jurisdictional offerings by world class foreign issuers and as an Exchange 
Act registration statement for foreign issuers other than world class 
issuers.224 Other commentators similarly suggested that the SEC should 
engage in some form of mutual recognition in order to permit foreign 
issuers to trade on the NYSE or other U.S. markets.225 Instead of following 
this type of policy, the SEC attempted to squeeze foreign issuers into the 
mold of U.S. issuers for purposes of Securities Act offering documents and 
annual and periodic reporting statements. 
This policy was reasonably successful to the extent U.S. capital markets 
were far deeper and more liquid than foreign markets, and foreign issuers 
needed to come to New York regardless of the cost of complying with U.S. 
regulations. But markets in Europe and elsewhere are now viable 
alternatives to the U.S. markets. Furthermore, U.S. investors are more 
interested in buying foreign securities than they were in the past. 
Frequently the SEC is more interested in protecting its jurisdiction and 
procedures for regulated entities and transactions than in adopting 
alternative regulations for companies that cannot or will not comply with 
the SEC’s rules, even if this results in an enormous unregulated market. 
This occurred with the development of the private placement markets as an 
alternative to the market for registered offerings. It has also occurred with 
the exodus of U.S. investment banks abroad doing business through foreign 
subsidiaries that they are not able to do in a differently regulated 
environment. The NYSE has determined to go to Europe to capture 
business that it has not been able to capture in New York, primarily because 
of regulatory impediments. Whether this business gambit will work out 
depends in part on the willingness of the SEC and European regulators to 
permit it to be successful. 
In order for truly global stock exchanges to develop, however, it will be 
necessary to dismantle national regulatory barriers—in the United States, 
Europe and elsewhere—to securities listings and replace them with 
international standards. Furthermore, the regulation of markets will also 
have to be reviewed in order to achieve international convergence of 
standards. 
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